Previous | Next

Jan.–Apr. 1984 · Vol. 13 No. 1–2 · pp. 49–60 

Evangelism Without Intolerance

Elmer J. Thiessen

There seems to be an increasing amount of concern about the problem of intolerance today. Jay Newman, in an important recently published book, Foundations of Religious Tolerance, 1 argues that religious intolerance is a “grave social problem” which has not at all disappeared with the crusades and the holy wars of long ago (pp. 162, 172). He argues that the primary cause of religious intolerance is the proselytizing or evangelism that is carried in the name of religion, especially Christianity. (The terms “proselytizing” and “evangelizing” are roughly synonymous, though the latter might be used more in connection with Christian proselytizing. In any case, “evangelism” is probably a term that Christians are more familiar with, and thus I shall generally use this term, except when referring specifically to Newman’s argument.) Given that intolerance “is the most persistent and the most insidious of all sources of hatred” (p. 3), and hence a very immoral attitude or activity, Newman expresses some grave concerns about one important cause of intolerance—evangelism. He therefore denounces most, if not all evangelism as an immoral activity. The purpose of this essay is to critique Newman’s argument and to show that evangelism can be a moral activity and that evangelism without intolerance is indeed possible.

Newman characterizes the relation between proselytizing and tolerance thus: Those who seek to convert others are described by Newman as “arrogant, ignorant, hypocritical, meddlesome” (p. 89). “There is something essentially intolerant about the missionary, the activities of the proselytizer are seen as objectionable.” “[Many] forms of missionary activity and overassertive ‘witnessing’ accompany, foreshadow, and promote more radical forms of religious harassment” (p. 88). Not only in the past, but more generally, we find that “most religious proselytizing tends to promote resentment. Resentment promotes intolerance, which in turn promotes barbarism” (pp. 110, 89, 108f).

Newman is willing to concede that “a limited amount of religious proselytizing” may be morally acceptable, at least from a utilitarian point of view (pp. 102f). For example, he admits that the propagating of religious beliefs can have psychotherapeutic value, at least for some; and that in the case of uncivilized tribes practicing human sacrifice, it is clearly of moral benefit for the missionary to seek to convince those {50} savages “that there is only one, benevolent God, who does not require or even like human sacrifice” (pp. 93, 95f). However, Newman is quick to add “that even from a utilitarian standpoint, most of the religious proselytizing that has gone on is probably morally unacceptable” (p. 103).

How then can we avoid the evils of intolerance bred by religious proselytizing according to Newman? We must find ways of inducing religious leaders “to play down” those doctrines that motivate missionary activity (p. 148). We must also replace religious proselytizing with religious dialogue which involves “the free interchange of ideas between two men who are both full-fledged speakers and full-fledged listeners” (p. 105).

I believe Newman’s analysis and critique of evangelism needs to be taken seriously because it is not just the opinion of an ivory-tower academic. The feeling that evangelism itself is intolerant and that it promotes intolerance and disunity is indeed widespread. It is therefore important for the Christian to try to answer these charges. One purpose of this essay is to expose some of the fallacies underlying Newman’s critique of evangelism.

One of the basic problems with Newman’s argument is that he tends to evaluate proselytizing as a general practice. He wants to determine “whether or not proselytizing as an institution is basically morally sound” (p. 92). But proselytizing is not all of one piece. There is all the difference in the world between an individual witnessing and the holy wars. We need to distinguish between aggressive and non-aggressive proselytizing, between evangelism that includes psychological manipulation and that which doesn’t. Newman himself, at one point, distinguishes between “the safe but slow methods of winning converts” and “unwholesome methods of winning converts” (p. 88). Thus, I do not think that Newman succeeds in showing that proselytizing as a whole is morally unacceptable. This will become more evident as we proceed to evaluate his arguments in more detail.

Despite this major flaw in Newman’s critique of evangelism, there is still much that we can learn by examining the specific objections he makes. I believe Newman’s critique of proselytizing can help us in clarifying the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable forms of evangelism, a distinction that Newman himself makes as I have shown above. I would suggest that perhaps Christians have not been sufficiently concerned about this distinction and the Biblical principles that should govern evangelism. In answering some of Newman’s principles governing Christian evangelism, principles which are sometimes overlooked by Christians, and principles which, if consistently followed, might make it less likely and at least more difficult for Newman and others to condemn, most, if not all evangelism as immoral. {51}


Newman provides a carefully sustained argument for his rather sweeping condemnation of proselytizing, taking into account utilitarian, deontological and epistemologico-ethical considerations. Newman’s ethical framework is of course quite secular in orientation, but I would suggest we cannot simply dismiss his criticisms on these grounds alone. As will be shown, some of the ethical principles Newman appeals to are quite compatible with Biblical principles and thus we as Christians need to pay heed to, and may indeed have something to learn from a secular critique of evangelism.

Utilitarian ethical theory maintains that an activity is morally good if and only if it promotes general happiness. Utilitarian considerations enter the problem of evangelism in two ways. We must first look at the utility of individual cases of evangelism. It has already been pointed out that Newman concedes that some proselytizing might have psychotherapeutic value and leads to the abandonment of some very unwholesome practices like child sacrifices. But this is not always the case, if we recognize the right of all religious groups to proselytize. Interestingly, Newman gives as an example the attempts during the sixteenth century to convert the Anabaptists, and he argues that since they were really highly civilized people, proselytizing probably would not have made them morally better people (p. 94). If all religious groups have the right to proselytize, then as Christians we must agree that some proselytizing, for example, that of the Satanists, will lead to greater harm for those being converted. But, more on this later.

The evangelical Christian, however, would want to argue that individuals who are converted to Christianity always stand to gain. After all, Jesus has promised eternal life, and abundant life. Clearly there are some liabilities in becoming a Christian, such as persecution, but the benefits far outweigh the costs, especially if we take our eternal destination into account. Thus, Newman’s objection concerning the utilitarian benefits for the individual are not fatal, at least with regard to Christian evangelism.

The second aspect of utilitarian considerations have to do with the institution of proselytizing as a whole. Again we are assuming that all religious groups have a right to proselytize. Newman argues that if we accept the right of all to proselytize we open the doors to a whole catalogue of negative consequences: resentment, intolerance, social disunity, hatred, bitterness, persecution, barbarism and ultimately the holy wars (pp. 95, 97, 101, 110). The key question here is whether or not proselytizing most often, or even necessarily does lead to these evil consequences? Clearly, it sometimes does, but this is not necessarily the case. Newman, unfortunately tends to load the dice by talking about {52} “fanatic”, or “aggressive” proselytizers (p. 96f). “When two groups of aggressive proselytizers meet, the result is inevitably ‘holy war’ ” (p. 97). True, but do proselytizers necessarily have to be aggressive? I do not believe so, and one purpose of this essay is to outline some moral principles that should characterize proselytizing activity, and if these principles are followed, they will not lead to the harmful consequences Newman envisages.

We must further keep in mind that many things which are in themselves good, or at least morally neutral, can be abused and thus become bad. And, as is well known, the higher the good, the greater the danger of abuse. Eating is a good thing, a pleasant experience. But, there is a danger of over-eating. This does not lead us to conclude that we should prohibit eating. Yet, that is precisely what Newman wants to do with regard to proselytizing. I want to argue that although there clearly are some dangers in religious proselytizing, the institution of proselytizing can have, and in fact does have very positive consequences for society as a whole.

How then can one defend proselytizing as a whole, from a utilitarian point of view? I consider it a major weakness of Newman’s that he entirely ignores a classic utilitarian defense of liberty made by the great nineteenth century liberal John Stuart Mill. 2 In his 1859 essay On Liberty Mill defends the liberty of conscience and thought, as well as the liberty of expressing and publishing opinions. Mill, in fact does from time to time introduce the topic of religious proselytizing and objects to attempts to restrict the “propagation” and “diffusion” of religious beliefs.

The institution of proselytizing is of benefit to mankind because without it, they may be deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth. To silence the proselytizer because he may be in error is to make the very questionable assumption of infallibility, according to Mill. Even if the proselytizer is propagating false beliefs, society as a whole still has much to gain by allowing such propagation, because the propagation of error stimulates thought and discussion, without which individuals and society as a whole are in danger of falling into “the deep slumber of decided opinion.” Truth held without opposition runs the risk of degenerating into superstition and dead dogma.

Proselytizing is a healthy phenomenon because it encourages controversy and discussion on “the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm,” and this enables even ordinary persons to rise “to something of the dignity of thinking beings.” Mill gives, as one illustration, a period of history when the benefits of such intellectual stimulation were especially apparent, the condition of Europe during the times immediately following the Reformation. This example is interesting in that it provides a corrective to the tendency, a tendency to which Newman himself succumbs (p. 94), to focus on the intolerance {53} of the Reformation period. Clearly the religious persecution that occurred at that time calls for moral outrage, but we must not lose sight of the positive dimensions of the religious fervour and extensive proselytizing of that time, dimensions which Mill underscores.

I would therefore conclude that the institution of proselytizing or evangelism can be justified on utilitarian grounds. The Christian can further maintain that individual cases of evangelism can also be justified on utilitarian grounds because converts will on the whole be happier, especially if one takes eternal considerations into account.

There is a final point that should be noted with regard to a utilitarian treatment of evangelism. Is utilitarianism an acceptable standard by which to judge what is right and wrong? Christians will join philosophers who have raised various doubts concerning utilitarianism. Surely truth and justice must stand above utility as a standard of right or wrong. Thus the other considerations that Newman introduces must be considered as of greater significance than the utilitarian considerations we have considered in this section.


Newman goes on to evaluate proselytizing from a deontological point of view. Immanuel Kant, “the most important deontologist,” maintained that right and wrong do not depend on consequences at all, but on the possibility of being able to universalize the action being evaluated. Universalizing an action enables one to think of others doing the very same thing one is thinking of doing. Kant’s principle, in fact becomes an expression of the Golden Rule. The deontologist therefore asks whether the missionary can approve of the proselytizing activities of others who do not share his religious convictions (p. 96).

Newman finds that this is often not the case. He expresses amusement at how the very same Roman Catholic friends of his who look favourably on their Church’s attempts to convert others, express an implacable hostility to others seeking to turn Catholics away from their faith (p. 96). Newman’s assessment also applies to many evangelicals. Although we want the right to evangelize, we hesitate extending this right to others.

We have here then a first principle that should govern evangelism. (1) When Christians evangelize and affirm the right to proselytize, we must at the same time affirm the right of others to proselytize. I believe Christians should from time to time publicly affirm this principle.

I hasten to add, however, that this principle should also be affirmed by the non-religious or anti-religious as well. I also never cease to be amused at how the very same “liberal intellectual” friends of mine who {54} object to religious proselytizing express unreserved support to the spread of secular and anti-religious propaganda by whatever means available. Rights must be extended both ways.

Newman fails to take into account another kind of deontological argument, as expressed in Kant’s second formulation of his categorical imperative. Kant says that we must always treat individuals as ends in themselves. This involves treating them with respect and allowing them to give informed consent to whatever is being done to them.

I would suggest that evangelism clearly can and often does satisfy this principle. Take for example, one paradigm case of proselytizing, the evangelistic meeting. In most cases people attend these meetings voluntarily in response to a personal invitation or perhaps to some advertising of this event. At these meetings, people listen to a sermon, after which an appeal might be made to members of the audience to make a decision and perhaps give some public expression of having made this decision. Again it is rather difficult to argue that people are not being treated as ends in themselves in this situation.

Now I would agree that there are cases where such evangelistic meetings do involve psychological manipulation and where it would seem that individuals are not able to give informed consent to what transpires. But, here again, we are dealing with an abuse of evangelism, which needs to be distinguished from proper methods of evangelism.

It is therefore important for Christians to keep in mind this second principle of evangelism. (2) Always treat the potential convert with respect and allow him to be able to give his informed consent to your efforts to bring him to Christ. Jesus clearly accepted this principle as is exemplified in his instructions to his disciples when he sent them out on a missionary tour. If the disciples found they were not welcomed in a town and if their message was being rejected, they were instructed to respect that choice and move on (Luke 9:5). When the disciples, facing an actual case of such rejection, wanted to call down fire from heaven to destroy the village, Jesus “rebuked them and they went on to another village” (Luke 9:55). Thus we see that Jesus respected the individual’s choice. He allowed a person to say “No”. He did not seek to coerce individuals into believing.

We too must treat those we are seeking to convert with respect. We should avoid excessive preoccupation with techniques and ways to manipulate people into believing. We must beware of psychological manipulation, a problem that is especially acute at mass rallies where group dynamics can come into play. We must also avoid approaches that are too simplistic and press for conversions too quickly, approaches where the potential convert cannot possibly understand what it means to become a Christian. We must not use force in gaining converts. (As {55} an aside, I would suggest that this principle should cause us to ask whether it is right to force children to say the Lord’s prayer in our public schools?)

There is one further aspect of treating persons as ends in themselves that should be noted. It is the whole person that needs to be treated with respect. All of his needs must be taken into account if we want to ensure that persons are treated as if they are valuable. Newman finds it somewhat disappointing that the “many who are anxious to share ‘good news’ are not eager to share much else” (p. 102). Newman points out that some of his Marxist friends have suggested “that ‘good news’ is a cheap commodity, at least as far as the seller is concerned” (p. 102). Newman concedes that this criticism may be a little unfair, because missionaries do believe that souls are important. But people are more than souls, and fortunately Christian evangelism has most often gone hand in hand with care for the entire person. It is perhaps in our witnessing at home that we need to pay more heed to what I see as a third important principle: (3) Evangelism should always be understood and practiced as part of a total concern for persons, and all of their needs, physical, emotional, social and spiritual.


Newman also argues that the ethics of evangelism must take into account the complex considerations having to do with the relation of epistemology (knowledge) and ethics. Here we need to take into account questions such as these: Are religious beliefs rational? Are they True? Is it right to believe that which is not rational, or at least not entirely certain? Is it right to propagate beliefs about which we are not entirely sure?

Newman begins by admitting that it is “intuitively obvious that it is usually morally right to believe and also to teach what is true” (p. 99). This claim is clearly beyond dispute, but it begs some important questions: What is truth? Can we ever be absolutely certain that we have the truth? It seems to me Newman’s principle concerning the moral rightness of believing and teaching what is true is unnecessarily restrictive. Given the finiteness and fallibility of human beings, we should more realistically deal with that which we believe to be true. I would therefore want to reformulate Newman’s claim so as to suggest that it is intuitively obvious that it is usually morally right for a person to teach what he believes to be true. In fact it can be argued that a person not only has a moral right but a moral obligation to propagate what he believes to be true. Christians believe the gospel to be true. Hence a fourth moral principle concerning evangelism: (4) Christians have a moral obligation to spread the “Good News” about Christ. The Great Commission of Jesus is not only a religious but also a moral obligation {56} for the Christian.

Newman, of course, does not want to accept this conclusion, and thus only concedes that it is right to teach what is true. He further raises some doubts as to whether religious beliefs are or can be proven to be true (pp. 94, 102). This of course raises a host of difficult questions, which cannot be dealt with here. Newman himself acknowledges the difficulties surrounding the question as to the truth or rationality of religious beliefs (pp. 96f, 101). As Christians, we believe that Christianity is true. I am also of the opinion that Christianity is rational and can be proven to be true. Hence, evangelism generally cannot be ruled out as morally unacceptable on epistemological grounds.

However, even though Christianity as a whole is rational, it is still possible to claim that Christians do not pay sufficient attention to the rationality of the beliefs they are propagating. Thus, we need to take heed when Newman criticizes proselytizers for not generally giving reasons for accepting their religious belief. Many missionaries “have difficulty carrying on an extended rational discussion of moral and religious subjects” (pp. 94f, 101f).

I would agree with Newman that not all missionaries pay sufficient attention to the problem of providing rational evidence for the religious beliefs they are propagating. But how many missionaries do this? “Many”? “Most”? We must be very careful in making such sweeping generalizations, and ensure that these too are backed up with sufficient empirical evidence.

We must also be careful not to demand too much of missionaries. After all they are not and probably do not claim to be theological experts. They are supposedly experts in spreading the ‘good news’, but that is quite different from being a specialist in theology. The missionary is like the expert in advertising, and we do not demand of the latter that he also be capable of “extended rational discussion” on the intricacies of the product he is advertising.

Further, how many ordinary laymen, or even teachers for that matter, are proclaiming certain scientific, historical or political truths without being able to back them up with sufficient reasons? Although, we would hope the layman is capable of some reasoning in support of his claims, we do not demand the sophistication of the specialist. Proselytizing in any area makes some appeal to authority, and justifiably so.

We are, however, right in demanding at least some ability in providing evidence for beliefs on the part of someone proclaiming any beliefs as true. Those involved in evangelism should be providing evidence for their Christian faith. Thus, we find Peter, Stephen and Paul arguing and debating with potential converts (Acts 2:14ff; 6:9f; 17:2, 17; 18:4; 19:8f). Thus, also Peter admonishes us to “always be {57} prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have” (1 Peter 3:15). This then gives rise to a fifth principle concerning Christian evangelism: (5) Evangelism must always include an appeal to the mind. We must give reasons and evidence for the faith that we hold. It seems to me that this is a principle that is too often neglected by Christians today.

There is another principle in Peter’s admonition to the Christian. When we defend our faith, we are to “do this with gentleness (or modesty) and respect” (1 Peter 3:15). I would suggest that Peter is here talking about epistemological modesty and respect. We need to respect others’ beliefs as well as their conviction that they are correct. We need to be modest in our claims. We must avoid dogmatism and arrogance in our proclamations. We also only see through a glass darkly. Our knowledge is only partial (1 Cor. 13:12f). There is an element of risk involved in the Christian faith as well. It seems to me that we are wrong in pretending to be more certain about our beliefs than is possible for fallible human beings. I therefore want to suggest as a sixth principle (6) that a degree of humility should be careful not to ascribe a higher degree of certainty to Christian belief than is warranted by the evidence.

Newman also argues that proselytizers are rarely committed to making known the whole truth. “Most missionaries methodically conceal truths” (p. 100). Again I would challenge Newman to provide the evidence for this sweeping generalization. We must also be careful that we do not demand too much of the missionary. Human finiteness simply makes it impossible to state the whole truth each time.

However, I believe there is still a point to Newman’s criticism. There is a danger that we misrepresent the Christian faith and experience. Christ is sometimes rather glibly described as the complete answer to all the problems and heartaches in one’s life. The Christian life is sometimes described as one of constant happiness and joy. But, this is surely false. Christians also suffer pain, have accidents and experience sorrow. In many ways becoming a Christian even increases the discomforts of life. Sacrifice is now required. There is greater sensitivity to evil. Persecution results. Thus, Jesus was careful to point out that following him would lead to conflict, alienation within families, and even persecution (Matt. 10:34-36; 5:11f). It seems to me that we as Christians are sometimes in danger of over-exaggerating the benefits of becoming a Christian when we evangelize. Jesus himself warned about counting the cost before deciding to become his follower (Luke 14:25-33). Too often, it seems to me, we do not confront potential converts with the issue of costs. I therefore submit the following as a seventh principle of evangelism: (7) Christian evangelism must be scrupulously honest in portraying not only the benefits, but also the costs involved in becoming a Christian. {58}


Newman is particularly concerned about the relation between proselytizing and intolerance. He makes two different claims that merit separate consideration. (a) Newman argues first of all that there is something inherently intolerant about the proselytizer (p. 88). He is arrogant and meddlesome (p. 89). (b) Secondly, most proselytizing tends to foster social disunity, hatred, resentment, intolerance and barbarism (pp. 101, 110).

I believe Newman is wrong in suggesting that there is something “essentially” intolerant about the missionary. I would agree that the attitude of the missionary is in danger of becoming arrogant and intolerant, but this is not necessarily the case, and I have already argued that missionary activity should be characterized by humility. I suspect Newman is bothered by the fact that the missionary thinks that he has the truth, that others are in error, and that others therefore need to listen to his version of the truth and hopefully be converted. But there surely is nothing essentially intolerant about this. All of us have these attitudes and feelings concerning our discoveries of truth in any area. As Newman himself recognizes, even the philosopher is not content with the conviction that he has found the truth. He feels the need to share it (p. 88).

It is precisely because these attitudes and feelings accompany all convictions concerning truth that we must cultivate the virtue of tolerance. In fact Newman, in defining “tolerance,” is careful to point out that for someone to tolerate another’s religious belief (p), it does not in any way involve “mitigating his judgement about the content of p, his judgement that p is false” (p. 8). It does not even indicate that he is not bothered by the fact that the other believes such and such. Tolerance does not involve “half-hearted acceptance or endurance” of the belief in itself, but of the person holding that belief (p. 8). We must respect the person, even though we consider the beliefs he holds to be false. As we seek to convince him of the truth we must also respect his freedom and his right to believe whatever he wants to believe, as well as his right to not want to listen to those of us who claim to have the truth. But, there is nothing essentially intolerant in trying to convince another person that he is in error and that we possess the truth.

Many examples can be found where those engaged in evangelism have been tolerant and where religious leaders have exhorted adherents to be tolerant of other faiths. I would suggest that Christians who follow Jesus’ example and instructions concerning evangelism will demonstrate tolerance.

The criticisms of Newman’s first claim also provided a partial answer to his second claim suggesting that proselytizing causes intolerance. {59} I would argue to the contrary, that evangelism which is itself characterized by tolerance will not cause resentment, disunity, intolerance and barbarism. It is for this reason that Christians need to be concerned about the moral principles governing evangelism. If followed, the negative consequences that Newman is afraid of, will not occur.

Here, however, we must be careful not to demand too much. Obviously success in evangelism will cause some degree of disunity within families or within a community. Some will become Christians and some will not. Thus, Jesus himself warned that he had not come to bring peace but a sword. Following him would lead to conflict and alienation within a household (Matt. 10:34-36). But this degree of disunity does not have to lead to resentment, intolerance and holy wars. We must come to accept a degree of pluralism in society as a healthy thing. We must learn to live with religious differences. Tolerance is possible even within the context of religious diversity that results from proselytizing.


Newman finds most proselytizing to be morally objectionable. He therefore concludes his essay by suggesting that we replace religious proselytizing with religious dialogue, the “missionary’s monologue” with genuine dialogue in which two individuals are “both full-fledged speakers and full-fledged listeners” (pp. 104f). This very modern sounding suggestion is made because religious dialogue represents the main way in which people of different faiths come to cooperate and to be tolerant of one another” (p. 104).

I do not at all wish to quarrel with the claim that religious dialogue is good and that it is an important and useful form of religious communication. I do, however, have some questions about the claim that dialogue represents the best way of promoting tolerance. Again I want supporting evidence for this generalization. I also question an implicit assumption being made to the effect that understanding and knowledge of other faiths will necessarily produce tolerance.

However, my main quarrel is with Newman’s suggestion that we replace proselytizing and dialogue, or at least that we eliminate most proselytizing in favour of more acceptable forms of religious communication. Behind this suggestion is the assumption that proselytizing and dialogue differ in that the former is prompted by “conversionist motives” which Newman would have us replace with “more profound” educational motives (pp. 109f., 106f.). I would suggest, however, that the distinction between dialogue and evangelism is not as sharp as Newman would have us believe. For one thing, evangelism too can and should be coloured by educational motives. I would argue secondly that dialogue too is coloured by conversionist motives. Most dialogue about {60} most topics includes an element of trying to persuade the person we are dialoging with that our own views on the topic are correct.

If we take Newman’s argument to its logical conclusion, we would have to eliminate most advertising, political campaigning, debates, teaching, including most lectures at universities which are notorious for monologue. In each of these examples a person is “actively seeking to convert a person or a group of people (Q) from not believing X to believing X (p. 89). Even the philosopher, as Newman himself admits in one place, finds it necessary to persuade others of the truth he has found (p. 88).

I would suggest by way of conclusion that there is nothing wrong with the conversionist motives inherent in evangelism. In fact such motives are probably much more common than most critics of religion realize. Such critics are, however, justified in expressing concern about certain morally unacceptable methods used in evangelism. But evangelism does not have to resort to such morally unacceptable methods. I have tried to uncover some moral and Biblical principles that should govern Christian evangelism. If Christians would always take care to follow these principles, then critics such as Newman, would at least have a harder time objecting to evangelism in the name of tolerance.

My concerns about moral principles underlying evangelism would seem to be shared by the apostle Paul. His admonition provides a fitting conclusion to this essay. “We have renounced secret and shameful ways; we do not use deception, nor do we distort the word of God. On the contrary, by setting forth the truth plainly we commend ourselves to every man’s conscience in the sight of God” (2 Cor. 4:2).


  1. Jay Newman, Foundations of Religious Tolerance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1982. Any page references which appear in the body of this essay will be referring to this book. For some comments on the book as a whole, see my critical review of Newman’s book in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 23/1 (March, 1984).
  2. J.S. Mill, On Liberty, Ch. 2.
Elmer Thiessen chairs the Division and teaches Philosophy at Medicine Hat College, Medicine Hat, Alberta. Dr. Thiessen is an alumnus of the Mennonite Brethren Bible College, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

Previous | Next